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Abstract:
This comment presents a comparative study of Special Purpose Acquisition
Companies (SPAC) in the international context and the United States. In the
course of examining international SPACs, it is necessary to first discuss and
analyze the history and development of private equity and how SPACs became
established players in the domestic and international markets. This comment will
examine the impact that these short-term investment devices have had for
investors, SPAC management, and private companies. The paper will evaluate
the perceived advantages and disadvantages of using a SPAC as an acquisition
form, as well as reflect on potential future developments pertaining to both the
United States and the international setting. While a particular emphasis is set
forth as to Europe and Asia, this scholarship aims to advance ideas and make
reflections applicable to the entire international community.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Private equity is a force to be reckoned with. It has quickly become a
major player in the United States, despite its relatively recent development
as an investment strategy. While private equity exists in the international
setting, and is constantly expanding, its growth has been slower than in the
United States.1
Within the broad field of private equity, the development of both a new
kind of corporation and a bold innovative investment device emerged: the
Special Purpose Acquisition Company (SPAC). As with any recent and
important progression, SPACs bring much attention, as well as many
unanswered questions.
This comment attempts to shed light into a relatively uncharted but
rapidly expanding field of investment opportunities. The following
discussion advocates for the increased use of SPACs in the international
context, both as an alternative method for privately held companies to go
public (commonly called an initial public offering)2 and an avenue for private
equity investment opportunities.
This comment begins with a brief discussion of the history of private
equity and SPACS, examining their methods of operation and the advantages
and disadvantages that come forth as a result. The comment then briefly
touches upon the regulation of SPACs in the United States,3 as well as
discussing in detail regulations that have been proposed or enacted in the
international context.4 The aim of the paper is to advocate for the increased
use of SPACs throughout the domestic and international settings. The
comment examines and sets forth data and analysis on SPACs in the United
1
See Alexandros Seretakis, A Comparative Examination of Private Equity in the United
States and Europe: Accounting for the Past and Predicting the Future of European Private
Equity, 18 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 613, 616 (2013).
2
See Initial Public Offering, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/ipo
(defining an initial public offering as “[t]he process of offering shares in a private
corporation to the public for the first time”) asp (last visited Nov. 18, 2018).
3
See SIMON M. LORNE & JOY MARLENE BRYAN, 11 ACQUISITIONS & MERGERS:
NEGOTIATED AND CONTESTED TRANSACTIONS § 3:11.20 (Nov. 2019) (citation omitted) (stating
“FINRA and stock exchange rules govern SPAC’s. SEC Securities Act Rule 419 may also
apply to a SPAC IPO if the IPO is not structured to avoid Rule 419’s application, which means
requiring escrow of IPO offering proceeds and banning any trading of SPAC securities until
after consummation of an acquisition as well as filing a Form 8-K upon any disbursement of
escrowed IPO offering proceeds”).
4
See Asia/Pacific, 44 INT’L L. 595, 604 (2010) (stating that in South Korea “the Financial
Services Commission (FSC) has proposed amendments to introduce special purpose
acquisition companies (SPACs) to the Enforcement Decree of the Financial Investment
Services and Capital Markets Act and the Financial Investment Business Regulations”; see
also Salvatore di Salvatore & Niccolo′ Scardaccione, Italy: Trusts and Foundations for the
Newly Established “Aim Italia,” Trusts & Trustees, July 1, 2009 (stating that the Italian Stock
Exchange regulates for “funds raised by the SPACs among public investors have to be
deposited and segregated in escrow into a trust account until the target company and object of
the buy-out transaction is duly identified”).

393

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

40:391 (2020)

States, as well as in countries where they have been implemented and
substantially used.5 While an emphasis is set forth as to Europe and Asia, this
scholarship seeks to advance ideas and make reflections applicable to the
entire international community. The paper concludes with a discussion of the
potential impact of increased SPAC usage, and presents a future outlook
regarding SPACs in the international context going forward.
II. HISTORY AND COMPONENTS OF PRIVATE EQUITY
INVESTMENTS
A. History of Private Equity Investments
A senior partner at Texas Pacifico Group, a leading private equity firm,
once said, “you can’t pick up the paper or turn on the TV and not hear about
P.E. [private equity].”6 The recent surge in “public-to-private” buyout
activity in the United States “calls into question the continued preeminence
of the public company.”7 The recent rise of private equity in the modern
United States investment market has been striking, especially considering its
relative youth and somewhat humble beginnings.
The beginnings of private equity can technically be traced to 1901, when
J.P. Morgan bought Carnegie Steel Company for $480 million, the first trade
of what would become the private market we know today.8 In 1907, the
Bessemer Trust was founded; a “family office” used to invest $50 million in
proceeds in private businesses and other exclusive holdings.9 But the private
equity market did not begin to take off until after World War II. The modern
origins developed when American Research and Development Corp. and J.H.
Whitney & Company, two of the earliest venture capital firms, were both
established in 1946.10
The events of 1958 allowed the private equity market to evolve into the
current-day private equity practice that exists in the United States today.
During the grips of the “Cold War,” President Dwight D. Eisenhower enacted
the Small Business Act of 1958 in an effort to bump up technological
advances against the Soviets.11 The Act allowed licensed venture capital
firms, known as “Small Business Investment Companies” (SBICs), to
borrow money from the government at below-market interest rates to be used
5
See Elena Ignatyeva, Christian Rauch & Mark Wahrenburg, Analyzing European
SPACs, 17 J. PRIV. EQUITY 64, 66 (2013).
6
Brian Cheffins & John Armour, The Eclipse of Private Equity, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 2
(2008) (citing Andrew Ross Sorkin, Of Private Equity, Politics and Income Taxes, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 11, 2007, at 37).
7
Id.
8
The History of Private Equity, INVESTMENT U, https://www.investmentu.com/content/
detail/private-equity-history (last visited Feb. 3, 2019).
9
Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
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for investing in entrepreneurial ventures.12 This spurred the growth of venture
capital limited partnerships in the 1960s.
In 1969, due to an increase in capital gain tax rates and the diminishment
of the initial public offerings market, the focus shifted away from financing
new ventures to expanding companies that were already in the private equity
managers’ portfolios.13 Over the years, private equity has experienced greater
growth spurts in some periods than others, due in large part to changes in the
regulatory and tax systems, as well as the overall market strength.14 That
being said, “private equity has been one of the largest and fastest-growing
asset classes in finance.”15 Hitting record performance levels in 2013 and
2014, more than 2,000 private equity firms sought an estimated $700 billion
of capital commitments from investors in 2015.16 According to the American
Investment Council, there were 4,188 private equity firms and 14,214
companies backed by private equity firms in the United States in 2015.17
B. Components of Private Equity Investments
Private equity encompasses a wide variety of investments involving
unregistered securities in private companies. A customary characteristic of
private equity is illiquidity due to transactions involving unregistered
securities.18 “Private equity includes venture capital, development capital,
mezzanine capital, [leveraged buyouts], and distressed investing.”19
Private equity firms were developed as the primary means for investors
to purchase private and public companies by using private capital. In regard
to public companies, the goal of private equity firms is to delist the company
from the public markets, effectively taking the company private.20 Private
equity firms pool together the funds of individual and institutional investors
and invest these funds in public or private enterprises.21 One of the main
functions of private equity, and maybe its greatest appeal, is that private
equity offers investors an opportunity to invest in private businesses that are

12

Id.
Id.
14 See id.
15 Sung Eun Kim, Typology of Public-Private Equity, 44 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1435, 1441
(2017).
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Seretakis, supra note 1, at 619.
19 Id.
20 Note, Going Private, 84 YALE L. J. 903, 903 (1975) (defining “going private” as when
publicly held corporations or private investors “reacquire from investors all the publicly held
common stock in their firms.” This effectively transforms a public company into a private
company, and, accordingly, the company no longer issues stock that is regulated or
transferable via the public markets).
21 Kim, supra note 15, at 1441.
13
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not otherwise readily available to buy and sell in the public markets.22 Private
equity firms provide the opportunity for multiple investors to be able to invest
in private companies or public companies in going-private transactions.
This is a significant investment device, as in almost all cases, an
individual investor on their own does not have enough capital to purchase a
significant share in a company. However, the private equity firm is the actual
owner of the portfolio company;23 the investors in a private equity fund have
a purely passive role.24 The private equity fund management is “solely
responsible for identifying acquisition targets, providing management
services to any acquired companies (including by negotiating their
financings), and, after a few years, selling them off again” in the hopes of
making a profit on their initial investment.25
III. HISTORY OF BLANK CHECK COMPANIES
SPACs originated as a direct result of the development and emergence
of “blank check companies” in the 1980’s. “A blank check offering is an
initial public offering of a company that has been formed for the purpose of
raising money and buying an already existing company.”26 By the end of the
1980’s, fraud and abuse were rampant in the penny stock market; penny
stocks were not registered and were not traded on a national securities
exchange.27 Blank checks provided an avenue to perpetuate this abuse.28 The
area drastically required regulation, which prompted Congress to pass the
landmark Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of
1990.29 Although the Act substantially limited and restricted blank check
22

Id.
See Portfolio Company: Everything you Need to Know, UPCOUNSEL,
https://www.upcounsel.com/portfolio-company (stating that “[a] portfolio company is a term
used to describe a company in which investors own equity in a company or buy out a company.
The goal of the investor is to increase the value of the portfolio company and earn a return on
their initial investment.”).
24 Elisabeth de Fontenay, Private Equity Firms as Gatekeepers, 33 REV. BANKING & FIN.
L. 115, 123 (2013).
25 Id. at 123-24.
26 Derek K. Heyman, From Blank Check To SPAC: The Regulator’s Response to The
Market, and The Market’s Response to The Regulation, 2 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 531,
533 (2007); see also Office of Investor Education & Advocacy, Blank Check Company,
http://www.sec.gov/answers/blankcheck.htm (The SEC defines a blank check company as “a
development stage company that has no specific business plan or purpose or has indicated its
business plan is to engage in a merger or acquisition with an
unidentified company or companies, other entity, or person.”) (last visited Jan 29, 2020).
27 Heyman, supra note 26, at 535.
28 See H.R. REP. 101-617 (1990), at 11 (stating “[a] common method or [sic] perpetrating
penny stock fraud is through the marketing of ‘shell’ corporations, or ‘blank check companies’
with no operating history, few employees, few or no discernible assets, and no legitimate
likelihood of success in the future”); see also id. at 11-16 (detailing examples of “blank check
companies” being used as vehicles for fraud against investors).
29 Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
23
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companies, they were not outlawed entirely. Then SEC Chairman Richard
Breeden recognized that “blank check offerings could be and were used in
legitimate business transactions outside the penny stock area.”30 The
restrictions imposed by the Act provided substantial protection to investors,
and the use of blank check companies as a vehicle for fraud effectively
diminished.
IV. EMERGENCE OF SPACS IN THE UNITED STATES
Due to the implications of the Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, the
“onerous requirements of [the Act] made it nearly impossible for a blank
check company to complete an acquisition.”31 As a result, blank check
companies effectively disappeared, but rematerialized in the form of
SPACs.32 Similar to the blank check companies of the 1980s, SPACs have
“no operating history, assets, revenue, or operations, and are designed to raise
capital in the public equity markets.”33 But, because SPACs avoid the penny
stock restrictions imposed by the Act, “SPACs are exempt from the controls
Congress imposed on blank check offerings and are therefore no more
regulated than traditional public offerings.”34
A SPAC is a special form of “blank check” company.35 This entity
surfaced in the United States in the early 1990s.36 The SPAC is a company
that is formed to raise funds in a public stock offering for the purpose of
purchasing a private business.37 Typically, using a SPAC, a “private equity
fund or a team of experienced executives with a solid track record . . . raise[s]
a no-asset ‘blank check’ IPO on the market with a time frame of eighteen to
twenty-four months to acquire a company.”38 If a target is found, investors in
the SPAC “have a pre-acquisition choice either to get their money back, or
to remain as ‘shareholders of the now-public firm.’”39 Sometimes called a
“poor man’s private equity fund,”40 SPACs give a wide range of investors
101-429, 104 Stat. 931 (1990).
30 H.R. REP. 101-617 (1990), at 22.
31 Daniel S. Riemer, Special Purpose Acquisition Companies: SPAC and SPAN, Or Blank
Check Redux?, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 931, 946 (2007).
32 Id. at 932.
33 Id. at 933.
34 Id.
35 Lorne & Bryan, supra note 3, at § 3:11.20.
36 Jeffrey A. Baumel, A Primer For Small-Cap Financing in the New Millennium, 240
N.J. LAW. 48, 48 (2006).
37 Heyman, supra note 26, at 540 (2007).
38 Efraim
Chalamish, SPACs Are Back, GLOBAL FIN. (Dec. 8, 2016),
https://www.gfmag.com/magazine/december-2016/spacs-are-back.
39 Usha Rodrigues & Mike Stegemoller, Exit, Voice, and Reputation: The Evolution of
SPACs, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 849, 851 (2013) (citation omitted).
40 See, e.g., Jim Fink, Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs): Will Investors
Live Long and Prosper?, INVESTING DAILY (Apr. 10, 2012), http:// www.investingdaily.
com/10914/special-purpose-acquisition-companies-spacs-will-investors-live-long-and-
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the option to invest in an opportunity previously only afforded to wealthy
investors: the opportunity to invest in a fund that acquires a private
company.41
V. COMPONENTS OF SPACS
Although SPACs are an important and rapidly developing type of
investment, they remain relatively unknown. Thus, it comes as little surprise
that current literature pertaining to them is sparse.42 SPACs constitute a
uniquely public form of a private equity fund.43 It is a newly formed company
“offering its securities in an initial public offering (IPO) to fund the
acquisition of a yet-to-be identified target company.”44 The SPAC holds
ninety-five percent of the gross IPO offering proceeds in trust until an
acquisition is consummated; five-percent of the gross IPO offering proceeds
can be used for routine operating expenses, but not for salaries or
commissions for management.45 If an acquisition does not occur within
twenty-four months of the IPO, the SPAC must liquidate and return the
investors’ IPO investments.46 A transaction must have a fair market value of
eighty percent or more of the SPAC’s net assets.47 A shareholder who does
not approve of the proposed merger has a right to liquidate his investment in
the SPAC.48 This effectively gives investors the right and proper assurance
that they will be notified of any proposed merger, and, if the investor does
not approve, they will be given their full investment back before the deal
takes place.
During the IPO stage, investors purchase units “representing one or
more shares of common stock and one or more warrants exercisable for one
share of common stock at a discount to the offering price.”49 Essentially,
investors are purchasing shares of the SPAC because they have faith in the
founders of the SPAC, the SPAC’s sponsors (“managers”). Investors are
taking a chance that the managers will be able to locate and acquire a
lucrative private company using the assets being held in escrow from the IPO
of the SPAC. If this occurs, it is likely that the share price of the SPAC,
already a public company, will increase as long as the private company that
prosper.
41 See Carol Boyer & Glenn Baigent, SPACs as Alternative Investments: An Examination
of Performance and Factors that Drive Prices, 11 J. PRIV. EQUITY 8, 8 (2008) (“SPACs . . .
provide the public with access to the private equity investments area, which was previously
available only to institutional clients such as hedge funds and investment banks.”).
42 See Rodrigues & Stegemoller, supra note 39, at 855.
43 See id. at 851.
44 Lorne & Bryan, supra note 3, at § 3:11.20.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id. (describing the net assets as the proceeds consisting from the SPACs’ IPO).
48 Id.
49 Id.
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is being acquired is a prosperous investment. As mentioned, the investors
also are usually offered warrants where they are entitled to purchase
additional stock in the SPAC at a discount.
VI. ADVANTAGES OF SPACS
SPACs are a unique investment opportunity that have a considerable
number of advantages for all of the parties involved: the target company and
its owners, the SPAC’s IPO investors, and the SPAC managers.
A. Advantages for the Target Private Business
In the view of the target business and its owners, a SPAC may be an
advantageous way for a small company to raise cash without having to
conduct an IPO of its own. There is little interest in the market for small
company IPOs, which effectively leaves smaller companies with few options
to raise cash.50 Additionally, many operating company management teams
do not wish to give up a portion of control to private equity investors.51
Finally, a standard initial public offering raises money that must go to help
finance the company. But the present owners often want to cash-out from the
deal. If management prefers to cash out, then allowing the company to be
purchased by a SPAC means “they will not have to sell their own shares in
the public market. Their own shares can be among those purchased by the
SPAC.”52 In sum, a SPAC may be more convenient to the target business and
its owners. It can significantly help avoid the problem that small companies
potentially face in taking their business to the public market.
B. Advantages for the SPAC Management
In the view of the SPAC management, the SPAC provides an effective
way to raise money and purchase a company to manage. Although managers
receive no salary, a “portion of the net offering proceeds that are not held in
escrow will be used to pay for directors’ and officers’ insurance, legal, and
accounting expenses. The costs of due diligence on prospective targets, as
well as the costs of negotiation, structuring, and gaining shareholder approval
for the merger, will also be paid from this money.”53 The funds that will go
to pay for these expenses are considered to be the “working capital of the
company.”54 It is “clearly convenient” for the management team to have this
working capital available as it searches for and attempts to complete its
business acquisition.55 Additionally, the managers typically receive a twentypercent interest in the SPAC’s shares as compensation for locating and
50
51
52
53
54
55

Heyman, supra note 26, at 547 (citation omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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negotiating a purchase of a profitable target company.56 This interest
becomes quite valuable if a deal is made, as in practical terms, the share price
of the SPAC is likely to rise if the deal is deemed to be profitable.
C. Advantages for the SPAC Investor
As discussed,57 the main benefits of SPACs for investors include the
right for their investments to be returned if a target company is not acquired
within twenty-four months or if investors decide that they personally do not
approve of the proposed transaction.58 Investors also have the opportunity to
make a substantial profit from their initial investment if the acquired
company is perceived to be a profitable company (and the stock price rises
as a result).59 SPACs provide an opportunity for all investors, regardless of
the amount of capital they have, to get a piece of the action in a private equity
investment. They provide “a way of getting exposure to private equity style
deals without having millions of dollars to invest.”60
VII. DISADVANTAGES OF SPACS
It is worth noting that there are some potential disadvantages of SPACs.
SPACs are still a highly sophisticated and usually high-volume investment;
it is not surprising that “the SPAC remains a risky investment.”61 It possesses
no assets other than the management’s professed “know-how”; “the investor
is basically betting on the management to make a wise purchase decision and
to negotiate a good deal.”62 Presumably, the investor would not invest in a
SPAC without confidence in knowing who the management is and their prior
history of investment success. Regardless, there are structural reasons why
SPACs could run into problems.63 University of Florida finance professor Jay
Ritter has noted that the eighteen or twenty-four-month time deadline
imposed on the management to make an acquisition, while protecting
investors by forcing a return of their investment if no deal is consummated
during this time frame, puts management under severe time pressure.64
Generally, the management of the SPAC receives a 20 percent interest in the
56

Id. at 550.
See supra Part IV.
58 See Heyman, supra note 26, at 543 (stating that the SPAC will fail, and an investor will
receive his investment back, if “more than 20% of the SPAC investors . . . vote against the
proposed merger”).
59 See Part V; see also Heyman, supra note 26, at 549.
60 Heyman, supra note 26, at 548-49 (citing Martin Sikora, Blank Checks Add Buyers, 41
MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS: DEALMAKER’S J. 22, 22 (2006)).
61 Id. at 549.
62 Id.
63 See id.
64 Id. (stating “[i]n terms of the executive involved, they’ve got every incentive to do a
deal, whether it makes sense or not, because if they don’t do one, they give the money back .
. . if they do a deal, that entitles them to a gravy train of salary for the foreseeable future.”).
57
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SPAC as their compensation fee upfront. Unlike investors, however, they are
not entitled to get any of this interest back if the acquiring transaction does
not occur. This creates an almost do-or-die situation for the SPAC
management. Thus, management has every incentive to make an acquisition
within the requisite time period. Coupled with the requirement that
management must spend at least eighty percent of the SPAC’s assets on a
transaction, this could lead to the SPAC’s management overpaying for the
target company or attempting to convince investors to approve a poor
acquisition.65
VIII. ARGUMENT FOR CONTINUED SPAC USAGE IN THE UNITED
STATES
Although potential disadvantages exist, it appears that SPAC’s
advantages outweigh any disadvantages. As discussed,66 the SPAC investor
has a powerful tool at their disposal: provided that twenty percent reject a
proposed transaction, the investors are able to block any deal that they may
not deem advantageous. Additionally, any individual investor, if they decide
that they do not favor the proposed transaction, can leave the SPAC and get
their full initial investment returned.
That being said, it is important that target companies and investors keep
the potential downsides in mind when considering whether to conduct
business with a SPAC. If the investors ultimately vote against a proposed
transaction, the target company has effectively wasted three to six months in
negotiations, and the investors “who approved the deal—which could be up
to 79%—will have to get their money back, net of fees and expenses which
can range from 8 to 15% of the total amount.”67 The investors lose their stock
warrants in the SPAC and the managers essentially come away with nothing
for the time and energy spent organizing the SPAC and pursuing target
companies to potentially acquire.68
In sum, these disadvantages do not seem to outweigh the substantial
advantages that SPACs provide to the target business, the managers, and the
investors. In a capitalistic market, these few downsides appear to be normal
functions of risk that correspond with undertaking intricate investments.69
The mechanism that SPACs provide target private companies to “go public”
is significant.70 Further, the potential downsides to the SPAC managers and
65

Id. at 550.
See supra Part IV.
67 Heyman, supra note 26, at 550 (citing Scott Malone, Crunch Time Coming for BlankCheck Companies, REUTERS, Mar. 26, 2006).
68 Id.
69 See id.
70 See Christian O. Nagler & David A. Curtiss, Market Trends 2017/18: Special Purpose
Acquisition Companies (SPACs), KIRKLAND & ELLIS https://www.kirkland.com//media/publications/article/2018/04/market-trends-201718-special-purpose-acquisitionc/lexisnexis-spac--naglercurtiss-aug-2018.pdf (stating “SPACs continue to be an attractive
66
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investors are mitigated as long as a profitable target company is acquired
within twenty-four months. This is typical, as long as seasoned and
competent management are running the SPAC.71 The mitigation of risk that
SPACs provide to target companies and investors, while still allowing for the
remarkable potential of profitable gain, make SPACs a viable and attractive
investment opportunity.
IX. PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTMENTS IN EUROPE
A. History of Private Equity Investments72
Although private equity originated in the United States, and the United
States remains the dominant market leader today, private equity has spread
throughout Europe.73 “The [United Kingdom] represents the most active
European private equity market both in terms of transaction value and
volume.”74 “The [United Kingdom]’s attractiveness is based on its stable and
favorable regulatory environment, sophisticated third-party advisers, welldeveloped debt and equity capital markets, and positive attitude towards
entrepreneurial risk.”75 “Germany and France, the largest and second-largest
European economies respectively,” utilize private equity but on a
significantly smaller scale than the United Kingdom.76
Outside of the United Kingdom, the European markets governing
private equity transactions have been somewhat hostile. Despite this, “the
European private equity market [has] managed to grow and mature from
1996 onwards.”77 In 2001, European leveraged buyout activity (LBO)78 for
vehicle for raising capital and an efficient pathway for privately held businesses to become
publicly traded on an expedited timeline compared to a traditional IPO”) (last visited Apr. 1,
2020).
71 Id. (stating “[m]arket interest remains strong . . . [w]hile it may be challenging to repeat
the robust IPO pace of 2017, the SPAC IPO market should remain strong in 2018”).
72 It is worth noting that when this article discusses the history of private equity
investments in the European and Asian context, the article is generally referring to the
implementation and regulation of these types of investments by European and Asian countries.
The article does, however, sometimes refer to the history or usage of United States companies
(or companies in other foreign countries) making private equity investments in these particular
international settings as well, which regularly occurs.
73 See Seretakis, supra note 1, at 616.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 616–17.
76 See Mike Wright et al., Leveraged Buyouts in the U.K. and Continental Europe:
Retrospect and Prospect, 18 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 38, 38–39 (2006).
77 Seretakis, supra note 1, at 663.
78 Patrick
Curtis, What Is A Leveraged Buyout?, WALL STREET OASIS,
https://www.wallstreetoasis.com/what-is-a-leveraged-buyout-lbo (last visited Feb. 3, 2019)
(defining leveraged buyout as “the purchase of a company while using mainly debt to finance
the transaction. Leveraged Buyouts are usually done by private equity firms and rose to
prominence in the 1980s.”).

402

Special Purpose Acquisition Companies
40:391 (2020)

the first time “exceeded that of the United States.”79 This was a result of
“economic forces fuel[ing] the growth of private equity and
overc[oming][Europe’s] unfavorable legal regime. The introduction of the
common currency, the euro, and the development of the European single
market facilitated cross-border acquisitions by eliminating currency risks and
investment barriers.”80 However, concerns still remain for the future growth
of the European private equity market. Subject to already relatively stringent
regulations on the transactional level, the European Union adopted the
Alternative Investment Fund Managers (AIFM) Directive 2011 in the
aftermath of the global financial crisis.81
The Financial Crisis provided an opportunity for Germany and France,
“the [two] main proponents of stricter regulation” of the private equity
industry, to pass further restrictive legislation.82 Despite the United
Kingdom’s strong resistance, the final version of the AIFM Directive was
“adopted after eighteen months of intense lobbying and heated
negotiations.”83 “The main goal of the AIFM Directive is to create a
harmonized regulatory and supervisory framework for alternative investment
fund managers . . . [t]he need for regulation was premised on . . . the systemic
risk that [lack of transparency] posed to the financial system.”84 While
concerns exist that the AIFM Directive could result in an “exit of private
equity firms and funds from Europe,”85 it appears that “underlying economic
forces have provided and will continue to provide a boost to European private
equity activity.”86
That being said, the potential impact of the United Kingdom leaving the
European Union is profound. On June 23, 2016, the United Kingdom voted
via referendum to leave the European Union.87 While “Brexit” was delayed
several times, the U.K. officially departed the European Union on January

79

Seretakis, supra note 1, at 663.
Id. at 664 (stating additional factors that have led to the growth of private equity in
Europe as “the abundant liquidity in the financial system made European banks eager to
provide financing to private equity sponsors. European banks were also increasingly willing
to provide larger loans for private equity transactions. The development of a European highyield debt market, virtually non-existent before 1997, provided an additional source of funding
for private equity dealmakers” and “[a]nother important factor was the financialization of
Europe during the 2000s. Europe saw its financial sector grow exponentially, with European
countries embracing the latest innovations of finance.”).
81 Id. at 655.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 655-56.
85 Id. at 665.
86 Id. at 665.
87 See Steven Erlanger, Britain Votes to Leave E.U., N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/25/world/europe/britain-brexit-europeanunion-referendum.html.
80
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31, 2020.88 The ramifications this has had in the United Kingdom, and
indirectly for the rest of Europe, have thus far been mixed.89 The likelihood
that the United Kingdom will no longer fall under the regulations of the
AIFM, which has created a single marketplace for private equity firms in the
E.U., may cause a “mass exodus from the [United Kingdom] as investors set
up shop” in other countries.90 However, a potential “silver lining” for the
U.K. is that the “European Commission and European Securities and Markets
Authority are currently considering allowing a number of non-E.U.
jurisdictions to access certain provisions of the AIFM directive.”91 In any
event, the U.K.’s favorable regulatory markets, coupled with the “quality of
its companies and their capacity to adapt,”92 seemingly would mitigate many
possible negative consequences of Brexit in the United Kingdom. The impact
of Brexit for the rest of the European private equity markets, and SPACs in
particular, remain uncertain and will be an important development to monitor
going forward.
B. Emergence of SPACs in Europe
The relatively recent success of the private equity market in Europe, as
well as the prospects for continued viability in the future, have led to the
emergence of SPAC investments in certain European countries. Further,
SPACs in Europe have developed as an attractive investment as they are
subject to substantially less regulatory measures than traditional private
equity in Europe.93 The first IPOs of European SPACs started in 2005, only
two years after the first SPAC went public in the United States.94
A notable difference between European SPACs and American SPACs
is that European SPACs tend to have more flexible regulations and tend to
not subject the management to as many stringent requirements. For example,
according to the United States stock exchanges requirements, specifically the
NASDAQ and New York Stock Exchange, the target company must have a
“minimal fair value accounting for 80% of the trust amount in order to
88 See Peter Barnes, Brexit: What Happens Now?, BBC NEWS (Feb. 5, 2020),
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-46393399.
89 See Leah Hodgson, No-Deal Means No Deals? How Brexit Could Impact UK Private
Equity, PITCHBOOK (Jan. 14, 2019), https://pitchbook.com/news/articles/no-deal-means-nodeals-how-brexit-could-impact-uk-private-equity (stating that “there has been significant
fluctuation in the number of transactions and the amount of capital invested in U.K.-based
businesses from European investors since 2016”).
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 See Ignatyeva, supra note 5, at 71 (stating that while SPACs regulated by U.S. stock
exchanges “are not allowed to have any specific target company under consideration at the
time of the IPO, European stock Exchanges . . . do not have these regulations”); see also id.
at 77 (“European SPACs perform the complete process of potential target selection,
shareholder voting, and transaction closing significantly faster.”).
94 Id. at 65.
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constitute a qualified business combination and to finish the SPAC’s
investment lifecycle.”95 To the contrary, many European stock exchanges do
not subject the management to these requirements, giving the European
SPACs the “opportunity to complete multiple smaller acquisitions instead of
a single, extremely capital-intensive acquisition.”96
Additionally, despite SPACs being listed on European stock exchanges,
“European SPACs do not necessarily have a focus on Europe, either in terms
of target companies and investors or in their actual country of
incorporation.”97 As a result, it appears that European SPACs do not make
much use out of any home-court advantage they may have pertaining to
Europe in comparison to non-European SPACs.98 Instead, SPACs are
generally listed on European stock exchanges due to beneficial tax
considerations and the seemingly friendlier regulations provided in Europe
than the United States.
C. Advantages of European SPACs
The European SPAC industry, although comparable to American
SPACs in most respects, share some key differences. If effectively utilized,
the advantageous tax considerations and friendlier regulatory measures in
Europe act as important advantages for European SPACs.
First, unlike the SPACs in the United States, SPACs in Europe are
allowed to have a specific targeting company in mind during the SPAC’s IPO
stage.99 This provides SPAC management with the opportunity to incentivize
investors to invest in the SPAC as SPAC managers have the option to discuss
with potential investors the companies they are considering targeting.100 This
benefits the investor, who has a clearer picture of the exact direction the
SPAC is pursuing and, therefore, the risks they are assuming in making their
investment.
Additionally, the United States stock exchanges requirements,
specifically the NASDAQ and New York Stock Exchange, that the target
95

Id. at 71; see also SPAC 101: Transaction Basics and Current Trends, WINSTON &
STRAWN (2018), https://www.winston.com/images/content/1/3/v2/135061/Winston-StrawnSPAC-Basics-Presentation-2018.pdf.
96 Ignatyeva, supra note 5, at 71.
97 Id. at 65.
98 Id. at 65, 67 (advocating that the driving force behind a given regional focus are “tax
considerations” and “stock exchange regulations”); see also id. at 77 (“European SPACs do
not necessarily purchase European target companies and do not have investors from Europe.
Rather, they can be seen as international SPACs that are listed on European stock
exchanges.”).
99 Id. at 71.
100 It is worth noting that this does have the drawback of increased potential for fraud
insofar as SPAC management may provide potential SPAC investors with deceptive
information in order to lure them into investing in the SPAC. That being said, this drawback
is mitigated by the fact that the SPAC investors retain the right to withdraw from the SPAC
before the acquisition is completed and receive their full investment back.
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company must have a “minimal fair value accounting for 80% of the trust
amount in order to constitute a qualified business combination and to finish
the SPAC’s investment lifecycle” generally does not apply to European
SPACs.101 To the contrary, many European stock exchanges do not subject
the management to these requirements, giving European SPACs the
“opportunity to complete multiple smaller acquisitions instead of a single,
extremely capital-intensive acquisition.”102 This is advantageous to the
SPAC managers as it provides them with greater flexibility in the type of
targeting companies they pursue. It is also advantageous to the targeting
company, as previously discussed,103 that there are many small companies
that are seeking to go public. The absence of this regulation allows for an
increased number of private companies to have the opportunity to become a
public company, particularly in regard to smaller companies. Finally, it may
benefit the investor, as data exists pertaining to European SPACs that “bigger
and perhaps more high-profile acquisitions are not always more successful
in terms of either operational or stock performance.”104 It is thus no surprise
that European SPACs execute “multiple smaller acquisitions in contrast to
the single, large transactions that are typical of U.S. SPACs.”105
D. Possibilities for Future SPAC Reform in Europe
European stock exchanges generally share significant differences with
the SPAC market in the United States. It might be thought that because
certain SPAC managers deliberately shy away from the United States,
despite the United States continuing to be the “biggest and most established
SPAC market in the world,” that they may do so to utilize more of a “homecourt advantage” in “exploiting unique insights into the domestic European
markets.” 106 However, in reviewing the limited research available regarding
European SPACs, this does not appear to be the case. Seemingly, the
European markets are utilized more as a proxy for non-European investors to
take advantage of the advantageous tax considerations and looser regulations
available than for European investors to gain a competitive edge in the
market.107
101

See Ignatyeva, supra note 5, at 71.
Id.
103 See supra Part VI.A (stating that “a SPAC may be an advantageous way for a small
company to raise cash without having to do an IPO of its own”).
104 Ignatyeva, supra note 5, at 77 (describing a comparison of more and less successful
SPACs to show “SPAC founders who choose smaller targets with more operational
profitability also show a better stock performance”).
105 Id.; see also id. at 65. (stating “European SPACs are more flexible and able to complete
their acquisitions more quickly, because of much less restrictive regulation at the European
stock exchanges”).
106 Id. at 67.
107 See id. at 77 (“European SPACs do not necessarily purchase European target companies
and do not have investors from Europe. Rather, they can be seen as international SPACs that
102
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It is puzzling as to why the data shows that European SPAC managers
“use home-court advantages in terms of market knowledge and investor
contacts only to a minor degree.”108 European SPACs would significantly
benefit from effectively utilizing these home-court advantages in the future.
Hypothetically, SPAC managers could pursue a locally owned or operated
target in their own domestic market and raise capital through the local stock
exchange. In this sense, they likely would be able to gain a competitive
advantage over their foreign counterparts. Foreign SPAC managers might not
be as attuned to the intricacies of the respective local market and its
economy.109 This targeted approach “is well-known and used in venture
capital and buyout funds, whose managers are known to run so-called
industry-specialist funds.”110 Despite the potential benefits in utilizing this
approach, and the multiple advantages that SPACs provide, European
managers have generally, somewhat ironically, not been a major player
within the European stock market.111
The perceived benefits of utilizing home-court advantages for SPAC
managers trickle down to SPAC investors, as well as SPAC target
companies. As a result of European SPAC managers investing in target
companies located in their domestic stock markets,112 the SPAC investment
as a whole would be better served and likely more profitable for each party
involved. Specifically, it can be expected that the SPAC managers would
make better informed decisions with the target companies they pursue. They
are more attuned to the intricacies of the local market and its economy, as
well as the particular target companies themselves, than foreign SPAC
managers. This should increase the chances that the SPAC’s share price will
increase after the transaction is complete, as there is a greater likelihood that
the chosen target company is an advantageous purchase for the SPAC.
Additionally, SPAC investors would feel more confident in the
management’s selected target company and that the proposed transaction will
lead to increased profits for the SPAC.113 As opposed to SPAC investors
are listed on European stock exchanges.”).
108 Id. at 65.
109 This is not to say that acquiring a target company located within the SPAC’s own
domestic market will always be the right, or the best, decision for the SPAC to make. Instead,
it is being advocated that, generally, this approach would lead to advantageous benefits for
each party involved in the SPAC process.
110 Id. at 67 (describing industry-specialist funds as “funds that target companies from a
given industry in a given market with which the fund managers are familiar”).
111 Coupled by Europe’s favorable tax considerations and the loose regulations imposed
on SPAC investments, utilizing home-court advantages seems to be a relatively no-brainer for
European SPAC managers.
112 It is important to recognize that not every European country has a domestic stock
market, nor, for that matter, has a private equity industry that utilizes SPACs. Generally, this
analysis pertains to European Union countries, as the E.U. adopted the AIFM Directive to help
regulate the private equity industry. See supra Part IX.A.
113 This is not to say that there would no longer be a need for SPAC investors to evaluate

407

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

40:391 (2020)

relying on foreign management, even with the advantage of the fortuitous
European tax considerations and looser regulations,114 the foreign managers
do not have the requisite knowledge and expertise of the local market and
economy. By assuring investors that the SPAC managers do have this level
of expertise and knowledge, the investors will feel more confident with the
SPAC management’s decisions. This should lead to a higher number of
proposed transactions that become completed acquisitions, as it is more
likely that the investor will have faith in the management’s decision of the
right target company to acquire. Further, this will lead to fewer
confrontations and animosity during the target company approval process,
less investors that leave the SPAC and ask for their investment “buy-in” back
before the acquisition is complete,115 and an overall more fluent and timely
process116 for the SPAC to complete the acquisition of the target company.
Finally, this would benefit the target company itself.117 As discussed,118
the target company and its owners usually seek to become a public company
as quickly and efficiently as possible. The SPAC’s characteristics are
advantageous to a target company in mitigating the problems that small
companies often face in getting to the public market. Here, there is a greater
chance that the SPAC managers proposed transaction will be approved by
the investors.119 Additionally, the increased likelihood that the investors
approve the deal should lead to a more amicable and efficient negotiating
process between the SPAC’s managers and the target company. This will
increase the chances that an acquisition agreement is reached. Finally, the
target company also wants the SPAC to be profitable and the share price to
increase as a result of the transaction. It is, in fact, the private targeting
company that is being effectively merged with the SPAC to become a public
company. Although some of the target company’s management may cash out
of the deal and sell their shares, many will continue to work for the newly
formed public company. Confidence in the SPAC’s management should help
assure the targeting company that going public via a SPAC device, and with
this particular SPAC, is the right choice for the future success of the
the SPAC managers’ proposed target company acquisitions; this would still need to be done
on a case-by-case basis carefully and diligently.
114 See Ignatyeva et al., supra note 5, at 67.
115 It is important to note that if fewer investors ask for their investment money back before
the SPAC acquisition is completed, the SPAC will have more money to work with in
purchasing target companies and paying for the SPAC managers’ operating expenses.
116 It is expected that increased confidence by SPAC investors in SPAC management to
make well-informed and prosperous target company acquisition decisions will lead to a
quicker and more efficient approval process.
117 As discussed, it is worth noting that, unlike in the American SPAC industry, European
SPACs are allowed to have a particular target in mind when soliciting investors.
118 See supra Part VI.A.
119 This is mainly due to the increased confidence that the investors will now have in the
SPAC’s managers that the proposed target company is one worth acquiring. Thus, it is more
likely that the proposed transaction will be approved in a timely and efficient manner.

408

Special Purpose Acquisition Companies
40:391 (2020)

company.120
X. PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTMENTS IN ASIA
A. History of Private Equity Investments
Although to a lesser extent than in the United States and Europe, private
equity investments are utilized in Asia. Private equity carries a relatively
strong reputation in Asian countries, where many see it as “sources of not
just funds, but also management expertise.”121
In recent decades, private equity growth has been particularly strong in
Southeast Asia. Major reasons attributing to this success are the new
regulations and other measures put in place by the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 2000.122 These reforms, which were “largely
modeled” on those in the U.K. and the United States, helped improve
corporate governance practices to protect the interests of investors and “have
served as a catalyst for private equity funds to invest in the region.”123 A
recent move by the ASEAN Economic Community may continue to spur
even more private equity activity in the future.124
Private equity investments have also been robust in China in the past
two decades. As recently as 2000, private equity was “little known in
China.”125 However, by 2010, private equity funds in China were incredibly
prevalent.126 In a series of new regulations and decisions, the “Chinese
government at the national, provincial and municipal levels sent strong
signals encouraging the country’s private equity industry.”127 As laws and
regulations continue to develop “rapidly,” it is no surprise that “the market is
now seeing more and more highly competitive local firms.”128

120 The decision of the target company in choosing which particular SPAC they are going
to reach an acquisition agreement with should not be taken lightly by the targeting company.
It is a significantly important decision, considering that the private company is essentially
investing the future of its company in the hands of the SPACs management, as well as the
applicable financial support of the investor, to become a public company.
121 See Ryushiro Kodaira, How private equity is shaking up Southeast Asia, ASIAN REVIEW
(June 27, 2018), https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Cover-Story/How-private-equity-isshaking-up-Southeast-Asia.
122 See id.
123 Id.
124 See id. (In January 2018, ASEAN “abolished nearly all tariffs in the bloc, giving
companies a stronger incentive to formulate cross-border strategies in Southeast Asia” and
that “private equity firms will likely play a significant role in these M&A deals”).
125 Lawrence Zhan Zhang, The Legal Environment for Foreign Private Equity Firms in
China, 16 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 839, 841 (2011).
126 See id. (identifying that in 2010 “eighty-two new China-focused private equity funds []
raised a total of $27.6 billion, and 363 new investments in the total amount of $10.3 billion”).
127 Id.
128 Id. at 843.
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B. Emergence of SPACs in Asia
Despite the robust private equity market throughout Asia, the use of
SPACs has not yet taken off in all Asian markets. It is important to note that
this does not mean that SPAC investments targeting Asian private companies
have not occurred throughout Asia in recent years.129 However, only two
Asian markets currently regulate SPACs: Malaysia and South Korea.
It is somewhat surprising that, despite the strong private equity market
throughout Asia, only two Asian countries currently regulate SPACs.
Pertaining to China, the use of SPAC investments by foreign investors to
complete mergers and acquisitions with Chinese companies has increased in
recent years.130 The surge of China-targeted SPACs is driven predominantly
by Chinese target companies themselves.131 Chinese target companies are
“typically interested in merging with a U.S. SPAC to increase visibility,
obtain enhanced prestige of becoming a U.S. listed public company, and
enable them to obtain liquidity out of China.”132 The size of the Chinatargeted market “provides large scale opportunities for continued growth.”133
While China has recently loosened regulations in hopes of stimulating
further economic growth,134 they have not yet addressed the SPAC market.
Strong reasons exist for China to do so. Besides the obvious economic
advantages, political factors are also advantageous for China to retain its
companies on domestic exchanges: more Chinese companies would
effectively be regulated in China and less in America . . . And China
regulating SPACs would indirectly hurt the United States economy, which
would provide a tool in the widespread “political sparring between China and
the United States.”135. It will be particularly interesting to follow future
SPAC developments in China.
129 See Jie Xiu & Brian C. Daughney, China Targeted M&A Re-Emerges in SPAC World,
N.Y.L.J. (Oct. 26, 2018), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2018/10/26/chinatargeted-ma-re-emerges-in-spac-world/ (stating that “[t]he use of a SPAC vehicle to complete
mergers and acquisitions with China targeted companies is not new” and “China-target SPACs
are providing a new wave of public listings and business combinations in the United States”).
130 Id. (stating “there has been an uptick in China targeted mergers and acquisitions using
the formerly and again popular reverse-merger concept through special purpose acquisition
companies”).
131 See id.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 See Aidan Yao, China’s Monetary Policy Loosening is a Sign that the Central Bank is
Gearing Up for a Fight, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (July 4, 2018), https://www.scmp.com/
comment/insight-opinion/china/article/2153565/chinas-monetary-policy-loosening-signcentral-bank (“The People’s Bank of China’s decision to cut the reserve requirement ratio by
50 basis points suggests the central bank has finally started to fine-tune monetary policy in
response to growing pressure on the economy and rising risks to financial stability.”).
135 See Elizabeth Macbride, Why this $35 Billion Private Equity Firm is Still Bullish on
China, CNBC (Oct. 2, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/02/35-billion-private-equityfirm-is-bullish-on-china-despite-trade-war.html.

410

Special Purpose Acquisition Companies
40:391 (2020)

In late 2009, South Korea became the first Asian country to implement
regulations and allow SPACs to list on its stock exchange.136 In 2011,
Malaysia followed suit and became the first Southeast Asian country to
follow suit.137 The regulations both countries passed, for the most part, mirror
the regulations of SPACs in the United States.
In South Korea, the regulations relating to SPACs require that: a
minimum of ninety percent of the proceeds of the IPO be held in trust
pending merger with the target company; the SPAC dissolves if it fails to
consummate a merger within three years of its IPO; and the SPAC does not
select its target prior to its IPO formation.138 Similarly, in Malaysia, the
regulations relating to SPACs require that: a minimum of ninety percent of
the proceeds of the IPO be held in trust pending merger with the target
company; at least eighty percent of the amount held in trust be used for
qualifying acquisitions; the qualifying acquisition take place within thirty-six
months from the close of IPO formation or the SPAC is forced to dissolve;
and SPACs abort proposed qualifying acquisitions if more than twenty
percent of their public shareholders vote against such an acquisition.139
C. Reflection on SPACs in Malaysia and South Korea
While it is too early to reach a definitive conclusion regarding the
impact that SPACs have had and will continue to have in the future on the
Malaysian and South Korean markets,140 the early indications seem to be
positive.141
In Malaysia, given the current business environment, SPACs “appear[]
to be a viable means for small local companies planning to break into the
E&P [Energy & Petroleum] sector, whether domestic or overseas.”142
Malaysian SPACs have attracted significant industry attention and have
secured investment from leading financial institutions and sovereign wealth

136 See Kab Lae Kim, The Characteristics of SPAC Investments in Korea, 22 KOREA CAP.
MARKET INST. 9, 10 (2010).
137 See Cheryl Yvonne Achu, SPACs Remain Important for Capital Market, NEW STRAITS
TIMES (Apr. 30, 2016), https://www.nst.com.my/news/2016/04/142569/spacs-remainimportant-capital-market.
138 Asia/Pacific, 44 INT’L L. 595, 604 (2010).
139 Achu, supra note 137.
140 See id. (stating “because of the SPAC’s ‘newness’, the grasp of [SPACs] is still low,
not only among investors but also regulators and certain financial industry players”).
141 Cf. Mark Rao, Structural Issues Hindering SPAC’s Growth in Malaysia, MALAYSIAN
RES. (July 9, 2018), https://themalaysianreserve.com/2018/07/09/structural-issues-hinderingspacs-growth-in-malaysia/ (stating that “[t]he success of special-purpose acquisition
companies (SPACs) in Malaysia can be undermined by arbitraging and other structural issues,
creating a need to reassess the market structure in support of them”) (emphasis added).
142 See Chee Yew Cheang, Malaysia’s Special Purpose Acquisition Companies Expands
Upstream, RIGZONE (Sept. 18, 2014), https://www.rigzone.com/news/oil_gas/a/135068/
malaysias_special_purpose_acquisition_companies_ expands_upstream/?all=hg2.
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funds.143 Although Malaysia does not require SPACs to be involved in the
oil and gas industry, many of the SPACs listed on the market so far are
involved with oil and gas.144 It will be interesting to track the success of these
SPACs in the years ahead and if SPACs outside the oil and gas industry start
to have more of a presence in the Malaysian markets.
In South Korea, the government adopted SPACs as an “alternative
investment vehicle in order to facilitate capital investment for small-medium
companies in need of investment for the business which has a significant
growth potential.”145 South Korea currently has over fifteen SPACs actively
trading on its market.146 SPACs “have garnered a lot of interest from retail
investors.”147 It will be interesting to track the success of these SPACs in the
years ahead.
D. Future Outlook of SPACs in Asia
As mentioned, it is somewhat surprising that given the robust history of
private equity investments in Asia, SPACs currently have a minimal role in
the Asian markets. As this article discusses, there are many advantages that
SPAC investments provide for all parties involved.148 While there are also
potential disadvantages of SPACs,149 the advantages, coupled with effective
regulatory and tax measures, seem to clearly outweigh any disadvantages.
Even though SPACs currently play a minimal role in the Asian
markets,150 this presents an advantageous growth opportunity for both
investors and SPAC management. The Asian SPAC markets utilize more
flexible and less stringent regulations than American markets. Specifically,
Asian markets allow SPAC management an additional year to acquire a target
company before the SPAC is forced to dissolve.151 This helps ease concerns
that SPAC management may not have enough time to select and acquire the
right target company.152 Additionally, this rule helps mitigate the risk that
143

Id.
See Rao, supra note 141.
145 See Review and Implementation of SPACs in Korea, FIN. POL’Y (Mar. 24, 2010),
https://fsckorea.word press.com/2010/03/24/review-and-implementation-of-spacs-in-korea/.
146 See Kim, supra note 138.
147 KRX fails to properly screen SPAC’s takeover of firm, KOREA TIMES (Jan. 8, 2012),
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/2013/08/602_102425.html
(stating
retail
investors’ interest is a result of allowing “public stock market investors to invest in deals that
are usually considered to be reserved for private equity firms”).
148 See supra Part VI (discussing the many advantages for the SPAC management, SPAC
investor, and the target private company).
149 See supra Part VII (discussing the disadvantages of SPACs).
150 See supra Part X.B.
151 Compare Lorne & Bryan, supra note 3, at § 3:11.20 (specifying that the SPAC has two
years to acquire a target company before being forced to dissolve in the United States); with
Xiu & Daughney, supra note 130 (specifying that the SPAC has three years to acquire a target
company before being forced to dissolve in Asia).
152 Heyman, supra note 26, at 549 (noting that University of Florida finance professor Jay
144
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management will propose a target company simply to ensure that the SPAC
is not dissolved. As discussed, a SPAC’s managers have “every incentive to
do a deal, whether it makes sense or not, because if they don’t do one, they
give the money back . . . if they do a deal, that entitles them to a gravy train
of salary for the foreseeable future.”153 It appears that SPAC managers,
investors, and target companies will all benefit from this regulation.
Accordingly, it is likely that SPAC investment will increase in the coming
years as these markets continue to develop and evolve.
Asia differs from American markets in advantageously extending the
time frame before a SPAC is forced to dissolve. That being said, the
American private equity and SPAC market is the largest and most prosperous
in the world.154 Accordingly, American regulations in place have shown to
be quite effective. The Asian markets have smartly mirrored their other
regulations to essentially fit the Americans.155 Given the strength and
prominence of the American economy and its proven track record of private
equity and SPAC success, this is a strong indication that the Asian markets
have a bright future ahead.
It is no surprise that the two Asian countries that currently regulate
SPACs on their markets have experienced strong initial investment. Every
indication is that SPACs will match the success of the Asian private equity
industry and continue to increase in both use and profitability in the coming
years.156
XI. FUTURE OF SPACS IN THE WORLD ECONOMY
SPACs should continue to be an important and effective investment
device going forward. The prospects for continued success and growth of
SPACs in both the American and the international markets are strong. As
discussed, SPACs provide a beneficial alternative to private companies as a
means to avoid the traditional IPO in going public. While the traditional IPO
has a storied history, especially in the United States, there are significant
drawbacks. Especially in regard to small private companies, the SPAC seems
Ritter believes that a time deadline of twenty-four months, imposed on the SPAC management
to make a transaction before the SPAC is dissolved, puts management under severe time
pressure).
153 Id.
154 See Seretakis, supra note 1, at 616.
155 Compare supra Part V; with supra Part X.B (showing Asian and American SPACs to
share many similar regulating provisions mandating a minimum of ninety percent of the
proceeds of the IPO to be held in trust pending merger with the target company; at least eighty
percent of the amount in trust account to be used for qualifying acquisitions; and for SPACs
to abort proposed qualifying acquisition if more than twenty percent of its public shareholders
vote against the qualifying acquisition).
156 See Achu, supra note 137 (stating “with the recent increase in offering sizes, the
presence of top-tier underwriters and active involvement of talented management teams,
combined with a strong equity market, SPACs should continue to attract investors and provide
a platform for growth”).
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to be a much more advantageous option. A SPAC is a great way for a small
company to raise cash without having to conduct an IPO of its own. There is
little interest in the market for small company IPOs, which effectively leaves
smaller companies with few options to raise cash.157 Additionally, many
operating target company management teams do not wish to give up a portion
of control to private equity investors.158 In a traditional private equity
transaction involving a private company, the acquiring private equity firm
will often replace the acquired company’s board of directors with new
management. Further, a private equity firm will often restructure the acquired
company, with the ultimate goal of taking the company public at a later time.
Alternatively, a SPAC provides a greater possibility that the acquired
company’s directors will be able to retain control, and the private company
instantaneously becomes a public company after the SPAC transaction is
complete. This process enforces important regulatory safeguards while still
allowing significant profitable gain for both SPAC managers and
investors.159
It will be important to carefully monitor the continuing progression of
SPACs, especially outside the United States. Favorable regulations have
already led to the emergence of significant SPAC investments in many
European countries.160 The strong potential exists for further growth if
European SPAC managers are able to effectively utilize home-court
advantages.161 Although SPACs have thus far played a more limited role in
Asian markets, early indications in Malaysia and South Korea are promising.
The continued growth of private equity investments throughout the
world’s markets bode well for the increased use of SPAC investments.162 The
emergence of SPACs is an “encouraging indication that the market is always
evolving.”163 It is critical that all SPAC parties continue to “actively explore
creative capital solutions that can be used to solve whatever sourcing or
funding dilemma they may be facing”164 going forward. As long as both the
participants of a SPAC transaction and the governments tasked to enforce
regulations stay attuned to evolving market trends, SPACs will continue to
157

Heyman, supra note 26, at 547.
Id.
159 See supra Part VI.B; see also supra Part VI.C.
160 See supra Part IX.B.
161 See supra Part IX.D.
162 In a sense, “modern-day SPACs closely resemble ‘one-time liquid’ private equity (PE)
funds: SPACs are publicly traded so that investors can easily dispose of their ownership stakes
at any time.” Ignatyeva, supra note 5, at 64 (noting that SPACs are different as they “perform
only a single transaction, whereas PE funds usually engage in a number of transactions”;
another notable difference is that “SPAC[s] shareholders get to vote on a proposed
transaction”).
163 The Rise of SPACs, SIXPOINT PARTNERS (Apr. 27, 2018), http://www.sixpointpartners.
com/rise-of-spacs/.
164 Id.
158
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prosper.165 As more SPACs begin to achieve acceptance in the public
markets, the “SPAC model may gain even greater acceptance as a viable
alternative for sophisticated investors seeking future alternative acquisition
vehicles.”166
The increased use and prevalence of SPACs in both the United States
and international setting is beneficial on both a micro and macro level.
Private equity investments will no longer be limited to the few and powerful.
SPACs provide an advantageous financial opportunity to both small and
large investors alike. Small companies will finally be ensured the equal
opportunity as large companies to go public. As a result, the economic
growth that countries experience will help the worldwide economy to
flourish.

165 Steven B. Boehm & Hannah L. Friedberg, Everyman a Venture Capitalist, 17 BUS. L.
TODAY. 13, 17 (2008) (describing “recent developments such as the decision by [American
Stock Exchange] to accept SPACs for listing suggest a growing comfort with the SPAC
structure”).
166 Id.
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